The Islamabad Framework ¶

April 2026 · Discussion Draft

Preamble ¶

This document is a roadmap toward a negotiated settlement, not a treaty text. It reconciles the principal proposals advanced by the parties — including Iran's revised plan and the United States' revised plan — into a single framework, setting out a practical path to end hostilities, preserve freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, keep Iran's nuclear program exclusively peaceful under effective verification, lift nuclear-related sanctions in phases as compliance is confirmed, and anchor the package in the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the applicable law of the sea. The framework is sequential and reciprocal: its steps should proceed in parallel where feasible and in agreed sequence where necessary, with sufficient transparency at each stage for the peoples of the affected states to assess whether their governments are meeting the commitments made on their behalf. References to religious or moral appeals for peace do not imply institutional endorsement by any outside authority.

1 — Cessation of Hostilities and Immediate De-Escalation ¶

All parties shall cease hostilities and threats of force, except as permitted under international law in the exercise of genuine self-defense. This cessation shall apply across Iran, Lebanon, and related theaters directly connected to the conflict.

All attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, and protected objects shall cease immediately. The parties shall further refrain from actions whose evident purpose is to provoke renewed escalation during the implementation period.

To reduce the practical risk of renewed attack, the parties shall negotiate reciprocal and monitored de-escalation measures, which may include phased force repositioning, agreed operational stand-off distances, suspension of specified strike activities, and other military confidence-building arrangements. The terms of such arrangements should be communicated to the relevant legislative bodies of the parties and published to the extent consistent with operational security, so that democratic oversight accompanies operational implementation. The objective is a durable cessation of war risk, not a temporary pause that permits rearmament under cover of diplomacy.

2 — Security of Navigation and Overflight in the Strait of Hormuz ¶

The Strait of Hormuz shall remain open to shipping and overflight without discrimination among lawful users, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and the applicable law of the sea.

Iran may continue to apply ordinary, non-discriminatory safety, customs, environmental, and traffic-management rules within its lawful jurisdiction, provided that such measures are not used to obstruct lawful passage. Oman's established role in the stewardship of the Strait and adjacent approaches shall be respected, and Iran and Oman may develop joint technical arrangements to support navigational safety, incident prevention, and crisis communication.

For an initial stabilization period, the parties may agree that no transit fees shall be imposed in connection with passage through the Strait, in order to reassure markets and reduce the economic incentive for renewed disruption. Any later fee or service arrangements, if adopted by agreement, should be transparent, non-discriminatory, and publicly defined.

Should the parties so agree, a neutral monitoring or observation mechanism may be established to provide confidence that the Strait will remain open and that no party may abruptly reintroduce closure or coercive interference.

3 — Exclusively Peaceful Nuclear Program and Verification ¶

Iran's nuclear program shall remain exclusively peaceful. Verification arrangements shall be sufficient to provide credible international assurance that nuclear materials, facilities, and activities are not diverted to military purposes.

To that end, the parties may agree to a combination of monitoring, inspection, material accounting, technical limitation, conversion, export, supervised storage, or other lawful and negotiated measures designed to close any pathway to weaponization while preserving the principle of peaceful nuclear activity under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Implementation of these measures should proceed on a reciprocal basis and in a security environment consistent with their success. Nuclear transparency should not be treated as a one-sided opening concession detached from the wider de-escalation process. Verification reports and assessments should be made available to the public in summary form sufficient to sustain confidence in the process. Where lawful and negotiated, questions relating to damage to peaceful nuclear assets, compensation, remediation, or technical substitution may be addressed in parallel channels.

4 — Phased Sanctions Relief, Frozen Assets, and Compliance Review ¶

Nuclear-related sanctions shall be lifted, waived, suspended, or otherwise eased in clearly defined phases as compliance is verified through agreed mechanisms. The sequence should be specific enough to provide credible incentives for performance, while preserving the ability of each party to verify implementation at each stage.

Frozen or restricted assets may be released in phases under applicable domestic and international law, with transparent public reporting sufficient to maintain confidence in the legality and integrity of the process.

Where domestic legislatures, executive procedures, or United Nations bodies have a formal role, those processes shall be respected. The parties should publish an implementation schedule identifying which measures can be taken by executive action, which require legislative approval, and which may require action through the United Nations system, so that citizens and their elected representatives can hold governments accountable for performance and compliance.

Any provision for the reimposition of sanctions in response to material breach should be narrow, evidence-based, and subject to defined review procedures. Automatic or politically unreviewable snap-back mechanisms should be avoided where possible, as they risk undermining confidence in the durability of the settlement.

5 — Non-Interference, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, and International Support ¶

The parties reaffirm the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. They shall renounce unlawful interference in one another's internal affairs and commit to addressing disputes through diplomacy, agreed monitoring mechanisms, and recourse to international law, including the principle that force may be used only in genuine self-defense as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations.

The parties should seek endorsement or support from the United Nations Security Council for the final package or its principal implementation arrangements, in order to strengthen legitimacy, monitoring, and continuity. The legislative bodies of the parties should be kept informed of monitoring outcomes and of any material changes in implementation status.

Because a durable settlement will require the alignment of broader regional realities with the terms of the core agreement, parallel consultations may be undertaken with relevant regional states and other directly concerned powers. Such consultations should support, and not delay or dilute, the central objectives of ceasefire, navigational security, peaceful nuclear assurance, and reciprocal sanctions relief.

6 — Implementation Sequence ¶

The parties should, insofar as practicable, implement this framework according to the following sequence:

1. Immediate cessation of hostilities and attacks on civilians.
2. Reciprocal and monitored de-escalation measures.
3. Initial navigation-security and incident-prevention arrangements in and around the Strait of Hormuz.
4. Commencement of agreed nuclear verification and transparency measures.
5. First-phase sanctions relief and initial release of designated frozen assets.
6. United Nations-supported monitoring and, where agreed, broader regional follow-on consultations.
7. Subsequent phases of nuclear assurance, sanctions relief, and normalization measures as compliance is sustained.

This sequence may be adjusted by agreement, but its guiding principle shall remain reciprocity: no party should be required to complete the core of its obligations in the absence of corresponding and verifiable performance by the others.